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Moody Investing and the Supreme Court:
Rethinking the Materiality of Information and
the Reasonableness of Investors
Peter H. Huang*

This Article critically analyzes the judicial decisions and rea
soning of the United States Supreme Court and lower courts
accepting certain defenses in securities fraud litigation. This
Article develops how and why the core notions of materiality
of information and the reasonable investor should be revised
in light of recent empirical data, experimental evidence, and
theoretical models of moody investing. This Article proposes
modifying three recent developments in materiality doctrine
to take into account moody investing. In particular, this Ar
ticle argues that current judicial treatment of puffery is flawed
because it neglects the power of puffery to alter moods. This
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Article also recommends modifying the judicial "total mix"
analysis of the materiality of information to include a "total
affect" analysis of information. Finally, this Article proposes
refining the judicially created so-called "bespeaks caution"
doctrine and statutory safe harbors codifying it to inquire
whether so-called "meaningful cautionary language" is in
fused with affect.
I.

INTRODUCTION

For better or worse, securities litigation and enforcement have re
cently become growth industries, with numerous allegations of se
curities fraud and malfeasance at, but certainly not limited to Enron,
WorldCom, the research analyst departments of many investment
banks, and several mutual funds . 1 The United States Supreme Court
and lower courts have gradually accepted over the last two decades
certain defenses in securities fraud cases that make it likely that
many such cases will be dismissed. But, publicity from those corpo
rate and financial scandals led to Congress nearly doubling the Secu
rities and Exchange Commission's budget from $439 million in 2002
to $776 million in 2003.2 Congress also passed the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002 which, among other things, targeted specific funding for
the SEC to hire at least two hundred attorneys, accountants, and
other professionals, and for enhancing information technologyi3 ex
tended the statute of limitations for private securities fraud actions/
and created a new crime of securities fraud.5 Thus, securities litiga
tion and enforcement will continue as booming legal practice areas
long after the notoriety of recent financial scandals fades.
The level and nature of securities litigation and enforcement do
and should depend on the level and nature of securities investing. In
particular, standard neoclassical financial economics models envi
sian rational actors cognitively engaging in securities investing to
maximize their expected utilities.6 But the real nature of securities
1 See generally Donna M. Nagy, et al, Securities Litigation and Enforcement. Cases
and Materials (West, 2003 ).
" Id at6 1 8 .
3 1 5 USCA § 78 (kk) ( 2002).
-1 1 8 usc§ 1 658 ( b ) ( 2002 ) .
0 1 8 usc§ 1 348 ( 2002 ) .
6 But see Lourdes Beneria, Economic Rationality a n d Globalization: A Feminist
Perspective, in Marianne A. Ferber and Julie A. Nelson, eds, Feminist Economics To
day: Beyond Economic Man 1 24 ( Chicago, 2002) ( pointing out how important emo
tions and moods are in actual human behavior) and Richard H. Thaler, From Hom o
Economicu s to Homo Sapiens, 1 4 J Econ Perspectives 1 33 ( 2000) (predicting that ra
tional and unemotional homo economicus will evolve into homo sapiens, a quasi
rational and emotional human being).
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investing can be quite moody.7 At this p oint, it helps to differentiate
among three distinct, but related concepts: affect, emotion, and mood.
Affect refers to a general and pervasive "feeling state that people ex
perience, such as happiness or sadness. It may also be viewed as a
quality (e.g. goodness or badness) associated with a stimulus ." 8 Emo
tions are "reactions to motivationally significant stimuli and situa
tions, including three components: a cognitive appraisal, a signature
physiological response, and phenomenological experiences .' '9 Moods
refer to "longer-duration background states of the physiological ( au
tonomic) system and the accompanying feelings." lD
It also helps to distinguish between expected emotions, which are
predictions of future emotional consequences of the outcomes from
decisions, and immediate emotions, which are emotions that indi
viduals experience while making decisions. 11 This Article focuses on
immediate moods, investors feel before or during investing, and there
fore complements my previous work on emotions, which are fully and
correctly expected before or during the decision making process.
12

7 See Lucy F. Ackert, et al, Emotion and Fin ancial Marke ts, Second Quarter Eco
nomic Review 33 (Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, 2003 ) (suggesting that emotions
can enhance financial decision making); and Michael Dowling and Brian M. Lucey, Th e
Role of Feelings in Investor Decision-Making, unpublished manuscript ( 2003 ) ( syn
thesizing empirical research on the impact of emotions on stock prices and developing
a theoretical basis for understanding that empirical research). See also David Dreman,
Th e Influence of A ffect on Investor Decision-Making, 5 T Behavioral Fin 70 (2004) (ex
amining investors' reliance on affect under information overload) .
'
· Melissa L. Finucane, et al, The Affec t Heuristic in [u dgments of Risks and B ene
fits, 13 T Behav Dec Making 1, 2 n . 1 (2000 ) .
0 R . Hastie, Problems for [udgment and Decision Making, 5 2 Ann Rev Psychol 6 53,
6 7 1 (200 1 ).
lo
Id.
11
See, for example, George Loewenstein and Jennifer S. Lerner, The Role of A ffect
in Decision Making, in RichardT. Davidson, e t al, eds, Handbook of Affective Sciences
6 19, 620-36 ( Oxford, 2003 ) (proposing this distinction for understanding how emotions
have different influences on decision making) .
1 " Peter H. Huang and Ho-Mou Wu, Emotional Respon ses in Litiga tion, 1 2 Intl Rev
L & Econ 3 1 ( 1 992) ( studying how emotions influence decisions to sue, settle, or pro
ceed to trial in game-theoretic models ); Peter H. Huang and Ho-Mou Wu, More Order
Without More Law: A Theory of Social Norms and Organizational Cultures, 10 J L,
Econ, &Org 390 ( 1 994) ( showing formally how guilt may sustain the honoring of trust
in principal-agent relationships); Peter H. Huang, Dangers of Monetary Incommensu
ra bility: A Psychological Game Model of Contagion, 1 46 U Pa L Rev 1 70 1 ( 199 8 ) (com
menting on emotions that arise from commodification and monetary commensura
bility); Peter H. Huang, Herd Beha vior in Designer Genes, 34 Wake Forest L Rev 639
( 1 999) ( discussing emotions that may occur when utilizing markets to allocate repro
ductive technologies and genetic engineering); Peter H. Huang, Reasons Within Pas
sions. Emotions and Intentions in Property Rights B argaining, 79 Or L Rev 435 (2000)
( analyzing the role of anger and shame in Coasian bargaining); Peter H. Huang, Inter
na tional Environmental Law and Emotional Rational Choice, 3 1 J Legal Stud S23 7
(2002 ) (proving mathematically that the fear of losing face can generate compliance
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The rest of this Article is organized as follows . Section I defines
moody investing and very briefly reviews empirical and experimental
evidence of moody investing. Section II explains why and how moody
investing affects whether information is material and whether in
vestors are rational. The remaining sections critically analyze three
recent, but well-developed aspects of materiality doctrine in securi
ties law because they fail to into account moody investing. Section III
assesses the so-called puffery defense because that defense ignores
the mood-altering power of puffery. Section IV critiques the so-called
" total mix" analysis of materiality and proposes the addition of a "to
tal affect" analysis of information. Section V advocates refining the
so-called "bespeaks caution" doctrine and statutory safe harbors cod
ifying that doctrine to inquire whether " meaningful cautionary lan
guage" affects moods. A conclusion summarizes the Article and sug
gests directions for additional research.
II.

MOODY INVESTING

Traditional finance assumed unbounded rationality of cognitive in
vesting, while behavioral finance focuses on the bounded rationality
of cognitive investing.13 The phrase " moody investing" stands in con
trast to cognitive or non-moody investing. There is experimental
evidence of systematic differences between two psychological pro
cesses that people utilize to construct their preferences, namely val
uation by calculation and valuation by feelings . 14 Recent research in
psychology and the neurosciences reveals that humans comprehend
and face risk utilizing two fundamental systems, one analytic and
the other experiential.1 5 Of course, in practice, "reason and emotion
are intertwined as the threads in an oriental carpet."16 But, moody inwith international environmental law); and Peter H. Huang, Trust, Guilt and Securi
ties Regula tion, 151 U Pa L Rev 1059 (2003) (demonstrating analytically that guilt can
reduce opportunistic behavior by broker-dealers and other corporate actors ) .
11
See, for example, Nicholas Barberis and Richard Thaler, A Survey of B eha vioral
Finance. in George C onstantinides, Milt Harris, and Rene Stulz, eds, Handbook of the
Economics of Finance 1053, 1054, 1065- 75 ( North-Holland, 2003) (reviewing the cog
nitive psychology of investing).
14 Christopher K. Hsee and Yuval Rottenstreich, Music, Pandas, and Muggers: On
the Affective Psychology of Value, 133 J Experimental Psychol: Gen 23, 24-28 (2004)
(reporting on four experimental studies and their implications ) .
'' Paul Slovic, e t al, Risk a s Analysis and Risk as Feelings : Som e Th ough ts a bout
Affect, Reason, Risk. and Rationality, 24 Risk Analysis 1-11 (2004) ( explaining the dif
ference between these two ways of processing risk and their implications ) . See also
Valerie F. Reyna, How People Make Decisions that Involve Risk : A Du al-Process
Approach, 1 3 Current Directions Psychol Rsrch 60 (2004).
16 Richard Restak, The Secret L ife of the Bra in 109 ( Joseph Henry, 2001). See also
Jeremy R . Gray, Integration of Emotion and Cognitive Control. 13 Current Directions
Psychol Rsrch 46 (2004).
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vesting refers to investing that is ( at least, partially) non-cognitive. 1 7
The collapse of the dot. com stock bubble is only the latest example
of moody investing.1 8 In addition to anecdotal support, there is em
pirical data that moody investing not only occurs/ 9 but also affects
securities prices and market performance.20 Experimental research
finds that individuals evaluate stocks not in terms of the relation
ships between risk and return, but instead based upon their global
attitudes towards those stocks .21 Experimental research indicates
that "factors other than technical fundamentals are often used by
market participants to gauge the value of securities. This phenome
non may be quite prevalent in markets for IPOs, where securities lack
a financial history The imagery and affect associated with securities
can be a powerful basis upon which to j udge their worth." 22 Affect
and images crucially shape people's attitudes towards securities and
their judgments concerning securities .23 On the positive affect side,
in 2000 and 2001, a $3 million advertising campaign in European
and Asian magazines and newspapers introduced a series of global
mutual funds alongside fashion supermodels and contained the af
fective tagline : "the most beautiful investments in the world."N On
the negative affect side, perceived dangers of genetically manipulated
organisms can stigmatize biotechnological stocks.25 Long-term fi
nancial images tend to be more positive than short-term financial
17

See generally Richard Geist, Investor Therapy: A Psychologist and Investing
Guru Tells You How to O u t-Psych Wall Street (Crown Business, 2003)i and Lawrence
E. Lifson and Richard A. Geist, The Psychology of Investing (Wiley, 1999).
lx
See generally Eli Ofek and Matthew Richardson, DotCom Mania: Th e Rise
and Fall of Internet Stock Prices, 58 J Fin 1113 (2003)i Maggie Mahar, Bull: A History
of the B oom, 1982-1999: Wh at Drove the Breakneck Market-and Wha t Every In
vestor Needs to Know A bout Fin ancial Cycles (Harper Business, 2004li and Roger
Lowenstein, Origins of th e Crash : The Gre a t B u b ble and its Undoing ( Penguin,
2004) .
IY
Andrew W. Lo and Dmitry V. Repin, The Psychophysiology of Real-Tim e Finan
cial Risk Processing, 14 J Cognitive Neurosci 323, 325-32 (2002) .
20 See, for example, Kevin Au, et al, Mood in Foreign Exchange Tra ding: Cognitive
Processes and Perform ance, 9 1 Org Behav & Human Decision Processes 322 (2003)
(providing empirical evidence of the impact moody investing).
21
Yoav Ganzach, Judging Risk and Return of Fin ancial A ssets, 8 3 Org Behav &Hu
man Decision Processes 353, 357-68 (2000) ( presenting four supporting experimental
studies ).
2 2 Donald G. MacGregor, et al, Imagery, Affect, and Fin ancial Judgm ent, 1 J Psy
chol & Fin Markets 104 ( 2000) .
23 Melissa L. Finucane, Mad Cows, Mad Corn, eV Mad Money: Applying What We
Know A bout the Perceived Risk of Technologies to the Perceived Risk of S ecurities.
3 J Psychol &Fin Markets 15, 18 (2002).
24 Suzanne Kapner, Selling Mutual Funds with Beau ty, not Numbers. NY Times,
Dec. 14 , 2000, at C8.
2 5 Baruch Fischoff et al, Investing in Frankenfirms: Predicting Socially Unaccept
a ble Risks. 2 J Psychol &Fin Markets 100, 107-10 (2001) .
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images.26 Finally, a recent event study documented that positive ab
normal returns and increased trading volume followed a company's
Super Bowl television commercials .27
Each of the following can affect moods on the part of investors
and/or securities professionals and in so doing, lead to moody invest
ing and influence securities prices: financial rumors/8 fluc tuations
in the amount of daylight over the yeari29 seasonal variations in bio
rhythms or sleep disruptions caused by changing from and to daylight
savings/0 and weather conditions.3 1 But, moods are not due to so2 " Donald G . MacGregor, Imagery and Financial Judgment, 3 J Psycho! & Fin Mar
kets 15, 18 ( 2002 ) .
27 Frank F ehle, e t al, Can Companies Influence Investor Beh a vior through A dver
tising! Super Bowl Commercials and Stock Returns ( unpublished manuscript, avail
able at www.ssrn.com) ( 2003 ) .
2 ' See generally J o s Van Bommel, Rumors, 5 8 J Fin 1 499 ( 2003); Robert Menschel,
Markets, Mobs eJJ Mayhem: A Modern Look at the Madness of Crowds ( John Wiley &
Sons, 2002 ); and Mark P. Schindler, Rumors in Financial Markets: Survey on How
They Evolve, Spread, and Are Traded On, Institute for Empirical Research in Eco
nomics, University of Zurich Working Paper No. 459 ( 2003 ) .
2 9 Mark Jack Kamstra, et al, Winter Blues: A SAD Stock Market Cycle, 93 Am Econ
Rev 324 ( 2003 ) (providing international evidence of a link between seasonal depression
and seasonal variation in stock returns). But see Patrick J. Kelley and J. F elix Meschke,
The Link Between Depression and Stock Returns: A Reexamination ( unpublished
manuscript, available at www.ssrn.com) (June 15, 2004).
3 0 Mark Jack Kamstra, Lisa A. Kramer, and Maurice D. Levi, Losing Sleep at the
Market. The Daylight Sa vings Anomaly, 90 Am Econ Rev 1005 ( 2 000); Michael Dowl
ing and Brian M. Lucey, Weath er, Biorhythms and Stock Returns: Some Preliminary
Irish Evidence ( unpublished manuscript 2002 ) .
·11
See, for example, Dowling and Lucey, Weather, Biorhythms and Stock Returns
(cited in note 30) ( finding that rain and clock changes around daylight savings have mi
nor but significant influences on Irish stock prices); David A. Hirshleifer & Tyler G.
Shumway, Good Day Sunshine. Stock Returns and the Weather, 58 J Fin 1009 ( 2003 )
(finding a strong positive correlation between morning sunshine at a country's leading
stock exchange and the market index stock returns that day at twenty-six stock ex
changes internationally from 1982-97); K. Lam & S . S . Lam, The Phenomenon of El
Nino. The Relationship Between Weath er and Stock Prices, Hong Kong Econ J (Apr.
22, 1 998) ( finding that stock prices in Hong Kong related to weather conditions, which
in turn were related to investors' moods); Edward M. Saunders, Jr., Losing Stock Prices
and Wall Street Weath er, 83 Am Econ Rev 133 7 ( 1993 ) . See also W. Kramer &R. Runde,
Stocks and the Weather: An Exercise in Data Mining or yet Anoth er Capital Market
Anomaly, 22 Empirical Econ 63 7 ( 1997) ( replicating Saunder's study for Frankfurt, Ger
many); M.A. Trombley, Stock Prices and Wall Street Weather: A dditional Evidence, 36
Q J Bus &Econ 1 1 ( 1 99 7 ) ( reexamining Saunder's study) . But see William N. Goetzmann
and Ning Zhu, Rain or Shine: Where is the Weather Effect?, National Bureau of Eco
nomic Research Working Paper No W9465 ( Feb 2003 ) (finding virtually n o difference in
the propensities of individual investors five major U.S. cities over a six-year period to buy
or sell stocks on cloudy days versus sunny days and interpreting this as evidence that at
titudes, behavior, and moods of market-makers, rather than individual investors, may
account for the relation between stock returns and weather); Tim Loughran and Paul
Schultz, Weather, Stock Returns, and the Impact of Localized Trading Behavior, 39 J Fin
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called "sunspots " that are beyond the control or prediction of securi
ties issuers . In fact, mandatory securities disclosures and voluntary
securities communications themselves affect moods and in so doing,
lead to moody investing.3 2 The legal and policy implications for se
curities litigation and enforcement of recent advances in our under
standing of economics, marketing, and psychology are the subject of
this Article.
Three recent economic models about how moods affect decision
making provide insights about moody investing. First, an economic
model that extends expected utility theory by explicitly incorp orat
ing feelings demonstrates how investors experiencing anxiety affect
asset prices .33 This psychological expected utility model also has im
plications for the amount of information that a doctor should give a
patient before an operationi34 policy issues raised by the increasing
availability of genetic testingi and raising the low personal savings
rate in the United States .35
S econd, the closed-form solution of a simple general economic
equilibrium model demonstrates that small fluctuations in the moods
of investors have potentially large impacts on stock prices.36 This
model assumes that these three hypotheses are true.37 First, investors
are unaware of their investment decisions being influenced by their
&Quantitative Analysis 3 43 , 3 45, 3 55-62 (2004) ( finding little empirical evidence Nas
daq stock returns are related to cloudy weather in the city where a company is based) .
.n Peter H. Huang, Regulating Irrational Exuberance and Anxiety in Securities
Markets, in Francesco Parisi and Vernon Smith, eds, Th e Law and Economics of Irra
tional B ehavior (Stanford, forthcoming) ( analyzing the implications of moods for the
long-standing debate over whether mandatory or voluntary securities disclosures is a
better system of providing information about securities risks to investors ) .
3 3 Andrew Caplin and John Leahy, Psychological Expected Utility Theory and An
ticipatory Feelings, 116 Q J Econ 55, 60-66, 66-69 (2001) ( introducing an economic
model of anxious decision-making and investigating the implications of anxiety in
that model for asset pricing).
34 Andrew Caplin and John Leahy, Th e Supply of Information by a Concerned Ex
pert, 114 Econ J 48 7 , 48 8 -502 (2004) ( applying the above model of anxious decision
making and psychological game theory to analyze whether a physician should reveal
the truth to a naively optimistic terminally ill patient ).
3 " Andrew Caplin and John Leahy, Behavioral Policy, in Isabelle Brocas and Juan D.
Carillo, eds, The Psychology of Economic Decisions: Rationality and Well-Being 738 7 ( Oxford, 2003 ) (applying the above model of anxious decision-making to behavioral
medicine and savings decisions ). See also Lauren G. Block and Patti Williams, Un do
ing the Effects of Seizing and Freezing: Decreasing Defensive Processing of Personally
Relevant Information. 3 2 J Applied Soc Psychol 803 (2002) ( offering practical advice to
practitioners on designing more effective health-related advertisements).
_�6 Rajnish Mehra and Raaj Sah, Mood Flu ctu a tions, Projection Bias, and Vola tility
of Equity Prices, 26 J Econ Dynamics & Control 8 69 , 8 73-83 (2002) ( deriving such a
model ) .
1 7 Id at 8 70.
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mood fluctuations. Second, investors' judgments of the appropriate
discount factor or their degrees of relative risk aversion fluctuate in
response to moods fluctuations. Third, investors uniformly and widely
experience the impacts of such mood fluctuations on their subjective
judgments or attitudes towards risk
Third, a novel economic model analyzes people's b ehavior as the
result of two interacting processes in the human brain, namely an af
fective system encompassing motivational drives and emotions and a
deliberative system taking into account broader goals.38 This model
formally captures the familiar notion of being " of two minds ." The
model has novel testable predictions for intertemporal preferences,
risk preferences, and social preferences. For example, the model pre
dicts that when the affective system plays a stronger role than the
deliberative system in decision making, the nonlinear probability
weighting function should become more S-shaped. In particular, this
means that when a person is under cognitive load or stress or when
her willpower is depleted, she will exhibit a more S-shaped probabil
ity weighting function. The model also suggests that risk aversion is
driven by the affective system .
Several strands of current psychological research explore the inter
play of cognitive and emotional processes.39 First, empirical research
supports an affect or " how-do-l-feel-about-it" heuristic, by which
people rely on their affective feelings in making decisions and judg
ments .40 Second, the risk-as-feelings hypothesis postulates that people
often perceive risks in visceral terms.4 1 To be clear, the affect heuris3s George F. Loewenstein and Ted O 'Donoghue, Animal Spirits: Affective and
Deliberative Processes in Economic Behavior (unpublished manuscript, available at
www.ssrn. com) ( May 4, 2004) .
.w See generally Eric Cich, Cognition and Em otion ( Oxford, 2000) . See also Louis C .
Charland, Is Mr. Spack Mentally Competent! Competence to Consent and Em otion,
5 Phil, Psychiatry, &. Psycho! 67, 7 1-72 ( 1998) ( describing recent neurophysiological,
philosophical, and psychological research suggesting that emotions are fundamentally
cognitive).
40 Melissa L. Finucane, et al, Judgm ent and Decision Making: The Danc e of Affect
and Reason, in Sandra L. Schneider and James Shanteau, eds, Emerging Perspectives
on Decision Research ( Cambridge, 2003) ( analyzing the affect heuristic); Paul Slavic,
et al, The Affect Heuristic, in Thomas L. Gilovich, et al, eds, Heuristics and Biases:
The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment 397, 400-20 ( Cambridge, 2002 ) ( defining the af
fect heuristic, providing empirical evidence, and discussing manipulation of affect);
Paul Slavic, et al, Ration al A ctors or Rational Fools. Implications of th e Affect Heuris
tic for Beh avioral Econ om ics, 3 1 J Soc-Econ 329 ( 2002 ); and Cass R . Sunstein, Haz
ardous Heuristics, 70 U Chi L Rev 75 1 ( 2003 ) ( reviewing Gilovich, Heuristics and Bi
ases ( cited above in this note), and discussing legal implications of the affect heuristic).
"1 George F. Loewenstein, et al, Risk-as-Feelings, 127 Psycho! Bull 267 ( 200 1). An
important aspect of such visceral perception of risk is probability insensitivity or neg
lect. See Yuval Ruttenstreich and Christopher K. Hsee, Money, Kisses, and Electric
Shocks. On th e Affective Psychology of Risk, 1 2 Psychol Sci 185 ( 1999) (providing ex
perimental evidence of such probability insensitivity); and Cass R. Sunstein, Proba -
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tic and the risk-as-feelings hypothesis are related and share a com
mon perspective that people do not simply deal with risks analyti
cally. Third, the Affect Infusion Model (AIM) specifies those condi
tions under which affective information becomes incorporated into
p eople's cognition and constructive processing, selectively and influ
encing their associative processes, attention, learning, memory; and
the outcome from their deliberations.42 The Affect-As-Information
model posits that people utilize their feelings at a given moment as
information regarding their attitudes.43 Fourth, affect and feelings have
both strengths and weaknesses in judgment and decision-making.44
Fifth, fairly subtle manipulations of affect, in particular inducing dis
gust and sadness, have dramatic effects on the endowment effect .4 5
Finally; patients with lesions in specific components of a neural cir
cuitry for emotional processing displayed less loss aversion and earned
more money in simulated real-life investment decisions than indi
viduals without brain lesions and patients with lesions in areas of the
brain unrelated to emotional processing.46
bility Neglect: Emotions, Wors t Cases, and Law, 1 1 2 Yale L J 6 1 , 70-82 ( 2002 ) ( devel
oping legal implications of probability neglect) . See also Thomas E. Nygren, Alice M .
Isen, Pamela J. Taylor, and Jessica Dulin, The Influence o f Positive Affect on t h e Deci
sion Rule in Risk Situa tions: Focus on O u tcome (and Especially Avoidance of Loss)
Rather Than Proba bility, 66 Org B ehav &Human Decision Processes 59 ( 1 996 ).
42 Joseph P. Forgas, Mood and Judgment: The Affect Infus ion Model (AIM), 1 1 7
Psyschol Bull 39 ( 1 99 5 ) ( arguing that the extent to which people rely on their feelings
to make decisions depends on how abstract, risky, and uncertain those decisions are).
See also Dolores Albarracin and G . Tarcan Kumkale, Affect as Information in Persua
sion: A Model of A ffect Identification and Discounting, 84 J Personality &Soc Psychol
453, 456-65 ( 2003 ) (presenting three experimental studies finding curvilinear influ
ences of ability and motivation on affect ) .
"·' Norman Schwarz, Feelings a s Information: Moods Influence Judgments a n d Pro
cessing Strategies. in Gilovich, Heuristics and Biases at 534, 536-547 (cited in note 40)
( presenting and reviewing evidence that moods influence information processing)i
Norman Schwarz, Situ a ted Cogmtion and th e Wisdom of Feelings: Cognitive Tuning
in L Feldman Barrett and P. Salovey, eds, The Wisdom of Feelings (Guilford, 2002Ji
Norman Schwarz and Gerald L Clore, Mood, Mis a t tribution and Judgments on Well
B eing.· Informative and Directive Functions of Affective States, 45 J Personality &Soc
Psychol 5 1 3 ( 1 983 ) ( proposing the Affect-As-Information modelJi and Norman Schwarz
and Gerald L Clore, How Do I Feel A bout W Th e Informative Func tion of Affective
Sta tes in K. Fiedler and J.P. Forgas, eds, Affect, Cognition, and Social Beha vior 44
(Hogrefe &Huber., 1 99 1 ) .
44 Michel Pham, The Logic of Feeling, 1 4 J Consumer Psychol (forthcoming, 2004)
(discussing the adaptive role of affect and feelings in judgment and decision making ) .
" " Jennifer S. Lerner, et al, Heart Strings a n d Purse Strings: Carry-over Effects of
Emotions on Econ omic Transactions, 1 5 Psychol Sci 33 7 (2004 ). See also Ellen Peters,
et al, The Role of Affect in the WTA /WTP Disparity, 1 6 J Behav Dec Making 3 09, 3 1 1 26 ( 2003 ) ( reporting on four experimental studies relating affect to the differences be
tween willingness-to-pay and willingness-to-accept prices) .
"" Baba Shiv, e t al, Investment Behavior and th e Negative Side of Emotion (unpub
lished working paper, University of Iowa) ( 2003 ) .
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Consumer and marketing researchers have also made considerable
progress in understanding the role of moods in persuasionY In fact,
the role of affect in the academic marketing literature is quite in
structive as it progressed through the stages of complete, then relative
neglect; recognition on an equal footing with cognition; general anal
ysis; moving past a distinction between positive and negative to focus
on discrete emotions; and reaching a consensus that affect and cog
nition are inseparable. Historically; the information processing model
of consumers as logical decision-makers was ubiquitous, treating af
fect as occurring only after much cognition, which is pre-eminent
and irrevocable.48 But, a few social psychologists argued that affective
reactions are primary; inescapable, and therefore as important as cog
nition.49 Subsequent marketing researchers emphasized how moods
impact the recall, evaluations and behaviors of consumers . 50 Other
marketing researchers have focused on specific types of emotions that
are common in commercials, such as warmth/1 fear, 52 or desire. 53
47 This brief synopsis draws upon the discussions in a Wharton graduate marketing
seminar on advanced topics in consumer behavior session about affect led by Patti
Williams . Patti Williams, The Role of Emotions in Persuasion, Address at the Associ
ation for Consumer Research Doctoral Consortium ( 2003 ) . See also Morris B. Hol
brook, Wh a t is Consumer Research, 14 J C onsumer Rsrch 128, 130 ( 1987 ) ( contrasting
marketing research with consumer research). See generally Wayne D. Hoyer and Deb
orah J. Macinnis, Consumer Behavior 236-37, 265-67 (Houghton Mifflin 3d ed, 2004);
Michael R. Solomon, Consumer Beha vior.· Buying, Having, and Being 227-3 1 ( Pren
tice Hall 6th ed, 2004).
•s Morris B. Holbrook and Elizabeth C . Hirschman, The Experien tial Aspects of
Consumption: Consumer Fantasies, Feelings, and Fun, 9 J Consumer Rsrch 132, 13234, 139 ( 1 982 ) ( arguing that many emotions and feelings matter to consumers ).
4 9 See generally Robert B . Zajonc, Feeling and Thinking: Preferences Need no In
ferences, 35 Am Psycho! 15 1 ( 1980) and Robert B. Zajonc & Hazel Markus, Affective
and Cognitive Factors in Preferences, 9 J C onsumer Rsrch 123 ( 1982 ) .
so
See, for example, Meryl Paula Gardner, Mood States and Consu mer Behavior, 12
J Consumer Rsrch 281, 132-34, 139 ( 1985 ) ( arguing that many emotions and feelings
matter to consumers) and Rajeev Batra & Michael L. Ray, Affective Responses Medi
a ting Acceptance of Advertising, 13 J Consumer Rsrch 234, 235-39 ( 1986) ( arguing that
affective responses to advertisements represent moods and feelings evoked by adver
tisements). See also Alexander Fedorikhin and Catherine A. Cole, Mood Effects on A t 
titudes, Perceived Ris], a n d Choice: Moderators a n d Mediators, 14 J C onsumer Psy
cho! 2 (2004) (presenting experimental evidence investigating the moderating role of
constructive processing in mood effects on risk perceptions of consumers ) .
51 David A. Aaker, et a!, Warmth i n A dvertising: Measuremen t, Impact, and Se
quence Effects, 12 J Consumer Rsrch 365, 368-69 ( 1986) ( introducing the "warmth
monitor" ) .
52 Punam Anand Keller & Lauren Goldberg B lock, Increasing the Persu asiveness of
Fem Appeals: The Effec t of Arousal and Ela boration, 22 J Consumer Rsrch 448, 45056 ( 1996) ( finding conditions under which anti-smoking messages that prompt low and
high fear levels are likely to be effective).
5 3 Russell W. Belk, et a!, The Fire of Desire: A Multisited Inquiry in to Consumer
Passion, 30 J Consumer Rsrch 326 ( 2003 ) ( developing a phenomenological account of
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Still other marketing researchers found that feelings in response to
commercials influence their cognitive processing. Another market
ing researcher investigated the conditions under which consumers
are more likely to rely on the "how-do-l-feel-about-it" heuristic . 55
54

III.

MATERIAL INFOR MATION AND

REASONABLE INVESTORS

Moody investing means that the United States Supreme Court and
lower courts should rethink their answers to what it means to be a
reasonable investor and what it means for information to be material .
The question of what is material information is related to the ques
tion of what is a reasonable investor because of statutory language
and judicial interpretation. 56 Although United States federal securi
ties regulation is mainly statutorily based, judicial decisions by the
United States Supreme Court and lower courts play a large role in the
statutory interpretation of the United States federal securities regu
lations. Although the literature about cognitive biases and heuristics
also suggest non-moody arguments in favor of rethinking materiality
and what is a reasonable investor;57 this Article champions a com
plementary and more fundamental rethinking of the notions of a rea
sonable investor and materiality based upon moody reactions to fi
nancial risks and securities disclosures .
The question of whether a particular item of information is mate
rial is central to securities litigation and enforcement . Rule 4 08 of the
S ecurities Act requires that registration statements contain, in addi
tion to particular specifically required disclosures, "such further ma
terial information . . . as may be necessary to make the required state
ments, in the light of the circumstances under which they are made,
not misleading."58 Rule 12b-20 of the Securities Exchange Act imposes
the same requirement in mandated periodic disclosures. 59 Questions
of materiality arise in the anti-fraud civil liability provisions of secdesire based on inquiries into daily discourses, interviews, journals, and proj ective data
in the United States, Denmark, and Turkey) .
"" Julie A. Edell and Marain Chapman Burke, The Power o f Feelings in Under
standing Advertising Effects, 14 J Consumer Rsrch 42 1 , 43 1 ( 198 7 ) ( finding that affec
tive processing and cognitive processing of commercials are intertwined).
s s Michel Tuan Pham, Representa tiveness, Relevance, and the Use of Feelings in
Decision Making, 25 J Consumer Rsrch 144, 1 46-57 ( 1 998 ) ( reporting on three sets of
experimental findings ) .
·'6 S e e notes 62-63 and accompanying text .
"7 Donald C. Langevoort, Taming the Animal Spirits of the Stock Markets: A Be
haviorol Approach to Securities Regulation, 97 Nw U L Rev 1 3 5, 1 84-86 ( 2002) ( advo
cating the rethinking of materiality in the context of open-market securities fraud).
"' 17 CFR § 230.408 ( 2002).
·'' 17 CFR § 240 . 1 2b-20 (2002) .
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tions 11 and 12( a )(2) of the Securities Act and Rule l Ob -S of the Secu
rities Exchange Act, in particular insider trading cases.60 Regulation
FD prohibits the selective disclosure of material, non-public infor
mation by issuers of securities.61
Rule 405 of the Securities Act defines " [t]he term ' material/ when
used to qualify a requirement for the furnishing of information as to
any subject, limits the information required to those matters to which
there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor would at
tach importance in determining whether to purchase the security
registered.' ' 62 The United States Supreme Court adopted this as the
standard for materiality: " there must be a substantial likelihood that
the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the rea
sonable investor as having significantly altered the 'total mix' of in
formation made available."63
Such a materiality standard raises the question of who is a reason
able investor? The definition of materiality for contingent or specu
lative information which the United States Supreme C ourt adopted
sheds light on who the United States Supreme Court b elieves is a rea
sonable investor.6 4 The United States Supreme Court adopted the
Second Circuit's probability/magnitude approach, which states that
materiality " will depend at any given time upon a balancing of both
the indicated probability that the event will occur and the antici
pated magnitude of the event in light of the totality of the company
activity"6 5 In other words, when it comes to information concerning
securities investment risks, the United States Supreme Court adopted
a materiality standard that focuses exclusively on the probability and
magnitude of the risky outcome. Earlier in that opinion cited by the
United States Supreme Court in Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U . S . 224,
238 ( 1988 L the Second Circuit states that:
" [t]he speculators and chartists of Wall and Bay Streets are
also 'reasonable' investors entitled to the same legal protection
afforded conservative traders ." Thus, material facts include not
only information disclosing the earnings and distributions of a
company but also those facts which affect the probable future of
the company and those which may affect the desire of investors
to buy; sell, or hold the company's securities."66
6015

USC § § 7 7k, 7 71, 1 7 CFR § 240 . 1 0b-5 (2002).
17 CFR § 243 . 1 00- 1 03 (2002 ) .
62 1
7 CFR § 230.405 (2002) .
r,; T S C Industries, Inc v North way, Inc, 426 US 43 8, 449 ( 1 976 ) .
6• Basic Inc v Levinson, 4 8 5 U S 224, 239 ( 1 98 8 ) .
6·' SEC v Texas Gulf Sulphur, Co, 401 F2d 833, 849 (2d C i r 1968 ) .
66
Id at 849.
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The court quoted a defendant's expert witness in a footnote to the
above quoted passage:
" [ t]he intelligent speculator assumes that facts are available
for a thorough analysis . The speculator then examines the facts
to discover and evaluate the risks that are present. He then bal
ances these risks against the apparent opportunities for capital
gains and makes his decision accordingly. He is, to the best of
his ability, taking calculated risks."
This description of how an intelligent speculator behaves remains
that of a person who cognitively evaluates and calculates securities
risks as opposed to reacts moodily and perhaps unconsciously to se
curities risks .
A response to rethinking the notions of materiality and reasonable
investor behavior is that many courts appear to view the reasonable
investor as referring to a normative idealized type of behavior, instead
of a descriptive realistic depiction of actual behavior. But, if this is the
case, one can question whether the practice of courts continuing to
utilize such a definition of reasonable investor and the related stan
dard of materiality is relevant or appropriate. 6 7 Courts have not elim
inated and will not even necessarily reduce moody investing simply
by holding that moody investing behavior is not reasonable, espe
cially if moody investing is prevalent and unconscious . 68 It is also un
clear whether moody investing behavior is unreasonable, b oth de
scriptively and normatively.
A different response to rethinking the financial model of reason
able investor behavior is that one should apply that model not liter
ally, but instead figuratively. In other words, the reasonable investor
model is a metaphor which provides a useful framework that enables
us to understand securities markets better than without such a
metaphor. Indeed, the same has been said of two well-known quanti
tative financial valuation models, namely the Capital Asset Pricing
Model and the Black-Scholes Option Pricing Model. 69 While the rea
sonable investor model is certainly a useful metaphor, this Article
67 Langevoort, Tam ing the A nim al at 186 (cited in note 5 7 ) (arguing that the defini
tion of materiality should be tied to commonplace as opposed to idealized investor
behavior).
r, s See Timothy D. Wilson, S trangers to O urselves: Discovering the Adaptive Un
conscious 1 3 0 (Belknap, 2002) ( discussing empirical and experimental evidence from
social p sychology that " people can possess one feeling while believing they have
another " ) . See also Piotr Winkielman and Kent C. Berridge, Unconscious Emotion, 1 3
Current Directions Psychol Sci 1 20 ( 2004 ) .
m Elton G . McCoun, Finance Models a s Metaphors, 1 2 Intl Rev Fin Analysis 421,
422-26, 432 ( 2003 ).
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will argue that the moody investing model provides a more accurate
metaphor.
Moody investing suggests a new definition for the materiality of in
formation which focuses on the magnitude of the risky outcomes and
on the degree or vividness of mental imagery. Such a reformulation of
materiality suggests that an emotionally rich presentation of infor
mation can be material while a less emotionally vivid presentation of
the same cognitive information can be immaterial. In other words, de
terminations of materiality would and should depend not just on the
cognitive form and content of information, but also upon the affec
tive form or presentation and emotional content of that information.
Moody investing suggests a new definition for the reasonableness
of investors which does not privilege cognition over affect, but in
stead acknowledges the reasonableness of some moods in certain sit
uations. Such a reformulation of reasonableness implies that drawing
a hard and fast line between cognition and emotion is artificial, if not
impossible. In other words, determinations of reasonableness would
and should depend not just on the cognitive nature and quality of in
formation processing, but also upon the affective nature and quality
of information processing.
IV.

T H E AFFECT OF P U FFERY

Under the United States federal securities laws, secuntles issuers
have no duty to disclose any material nonpublic information they
posses just because that information is material unless they have an
independent duty to disclose that information .70 But if and once an
issuer of securities chooses to make voluntary disclosures, that issuer
has a duty to speak completely.71 In other words, there is a half-truth
doctrine, under which statements that are literally true but omit
some material fact, thereby making them misleading, are actionable
under the federal securities laws . 72 In addition, some courts find that
if a securities issuer chooses to make voluntary forward-looking dis
closures, a securities issuer also has a duty to update those forward
looking statements to reflect any subsequent developments as long
as the original disclosures remain alive in the securities market
place.73 But, Section 409 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act added to the Se70 Basic Inc v Levinson. 485 US 224, 239 n. 1 7 ( 1 98 8 ); Glazer v Formica Corp, 964 F2d
149, 1 5 7 ( 2d Cir 1992); and Backman v Polaroid, 9 1 0 F2d 10, 12 ( l st Cir 1990) ( en bane ) .
7 1 First Virginia Banksh ares v Benson, 5 5 9 F 2 d 130 7, 1 3 1 4 (5th C i r 1 9 7 7 ), cert. de
nied, 435 US 952 ( 1 97 8 )
7 2 S e e generally Donald C . Langevoort, Half- Tru ths: Protecting Mistaken Inferences
by Investors and Others. 52 Stan L Rev 8 7 ( 1 999) ( discussing the half-truth doctrine).
n Greenfield v Heu blein, Inc, 742 F2d 75 1 , 758 (3rd Cir 1984); In re Time- Warner
Securities Litigation, 9 F3d 259, 268 (2d Cir 1 993 ); In re Bmlington Coat Fac tory Se-
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curities Exchange Act a new S ection 1 3 (1) that mandates real time
disclosures of " additional information concerning material changes
in the financial condition or operations of" securities issuers.74
Rule l Ob-S prohibits material misrepresentations and omissions.75
A crucial issue for a successful Rule l Ob-S claim is whether the state
ments made were material. But, materiality is a complex notion. In
particular, "projections and statements of optimism may trigger lia
bility under federal securities laws ." 7 6 But such statements may also
fall under the protection of the so-called puffery defense or puffery
doctrine. Under the puffery defense, statements that are too vague,
promotional, or hyperbolic, constitute mere puffery and are therefore
immaterial as a matter of law. 77 The puffery doctrine is closely related
to the half-truth doctrine, under which there is a duty to speak com
pletely if one chooses to speak.78 The puffery doctrine is also closely
related to so-called puffery claims arising in Federal Trade Commis
sion ( FTC ) regulation of consumer product advertising/9 cases of
FTC enforcement prosecutions against deceptive advertising;80 and
the FTC 's Policy Statement on D eceptionY
curities Litigation, 1 1 4 F3 d 1 4 10, 1 432 (3d Cir 1997); and Weiner v Q u aker O ats Co,
1 29 F3d 3 10, 3 1 8 (3d Cir 1 9 7 7 ) .
7 " 1 5 USCA § 78. 13 (1) (2003 ) .
7 0 l 7 CFR § 240 . l 0b-5 (2002) .
7 6 I n r e Syntex Cor. Securities Litigation, 855 F Supp 1086, 1 096 ( ND Cal l 994 ) . See
also In re Apple Compu ter Securities Litigation, 886 F2d 1 1 09, 1 1 1 3 ( 9th Cir 1 989);
Marx v Compu ter Sciences Corp, 507 F2d 485, 492 ( 9th Cir 1 974); and G etJ M, Inc v
Newbern, 488 F2d 742, 746 (9th Cir 1 9 73 ) .
7 7 Note, Securities Fraud o r Mere Puffery: R efinement of the Corporate Puffery De
fense, 5 1 Vand L Rev 1049, 1 055-92 ( 1998 ) ( discussing the puffery defense).
7 s Langevoort, Half Tnzths at 121 -24 (cited in note 72) ( discussing the close relation
ship between the puffery or general optimism doctrine and the half-truth doctrine).
7 9 See generally Ivan L Preston, The Great American Blow- Up: Puffery in A dver
tising and Selling (Wisconsin 2d ed, 1 996); Ivan L Preston, Th e Tangled Web They
Weave: Tnz th, Falsity and A dvertisers ( Wisconsin, 1 996); Terence A. Shrimp, A dver
tising, Promotion, and Supplem ental A spects of Integrated Marketing Communica
tion (SW College 6th ed, 2003 ) .
� o See, for example, Florence Mfg C o v ! C. Dowel etJ Co, 1 78 F 73, 75 (2nd C i r 19 1 0 )
(stating that " [t ]he law is not made for experts but t o protect the public, -that vast mul
titude which includes the ignorant, the unthinking and the credulous, who, in making
purchases, do not stop to analyze but too often are governed by appearances and general
impressions " ); Aronberg v FTC, 132 F2d 165, 1 6 7 ( 7th Cir 1 942) ( stating " the buying
public does not ordinarily carefully study or weigh each word in an advertisement" and
that " [a]dvertisements are intended not 'to be carefully dissected with a dictionary at
hand, but rather to produce an impression upon' prospective purchasers " ( quoting New
ton Tea etJ Spice Co v United States, 288 F 475, 479 (6th Cir 1923 ) ) ); Standard Oil Co of
California v FTC, 5 7 7 F2d 653, 659 (9th C ir 1 978 ) ( stating " that commercial messages
might lead the average viewer, in his anxiety . . . to overreact even though upon careful
reflection he might see for himself the limitations inherent in the advertiser's claim " ) .
� � An advertisement is deceptive when there is "a misrepresentation, omission or
other practice, that misleads the consumer acting reasonably in the circumstances, to
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The FTC's Policy Statement on Deception states that an adver
tisement is deceptive when there is " a misrepresentation, omission
or other practice, that misleads the consumer acting reasonably in
the circumstances, to the consumer's detriment."82 The FTC also reg
ulates what advertisements do not say, that is, when they omit mate
rial information that affects a consumer's decision to purchase the
advertised goods or services . In deceptive advertising claims by com
petitors,83 and trademark infringement claims under the Lanham
Act;84 courts already adopt empirical survey evidence and expert wit
ness testimony in determining consumers' perceptions. 85 Two legal
scholars proposed that courts utilize measurable survey evidence to
determine the actual perceptions of symbolic government action en
dorsing religion and in so doing test for violations of the Establish
ment Clause of the First Amendment.86 Similarly, this Article sug
gests that moody investing also argues for courts adopting survey
evidence to determine if puffery affects moods and in so doing, secu
rities investing. Of course, there must be established protocols and
procedures for conducting surveys . Some legal scholars and econo
mists have questioned the nature and reliability of survey data from
contingent valuation methodology. 8 7 Also, economists historically
are suspicious of the meaning and veracity of survey data (preferring
to make statistical inferences from observable quantitative market
data by econometric methods ).88
the consumer's detriment." Policy Statement on Deception, 4 Trade Reg Rep (CCH)
<j] 1 3, 205 at 20, 9 1 7 ( FTC Oct. 1 4, 1 983). In determining if an advertisement deceives
consumers, the FTC asks what does the advertisement say or imply, and does the ad
vertisement have a reasonable basis for its claims '
ol
Policy Statement on D eception, 4 Trade Reg Rep ( CCH) <J] 1 3, 205 at 20, 9 1 7 ( FTC
Oct . 1 4, 1 983). To determine if an advertiser has deceived consumers, the FTC con
ducts a two-part analysis: ( 1 ) What does the advertisement say or imply? and (2) Does
the advertiser have a reasonable basis for its claims ?
x.l
1 5 USC § 1 1 25( a)( l )( B ) .
x 4 1 5 U S C § 1 05 1 et s e q ( 1 994 ) .
xo
See, for example, Southland Sod Farms v Stover Seed Co. 1 08 F3 d 1 1 34, 1 1 40 ( 9th
Cir 1 997) ( " Reactions of the public are typically tested through the use of consumer
surveys -" ); and Qualitex Co v Jacobson Prods. Co, No CV-90- 1 1 83HLH, 1 99 1 Dist.
LEXIS 2 1 1 72, at * 1 4- 1 5 (CD Cal 1 99 1 ), aff'd in part &rev'd on other grounds, 13 F3 d
1 297, rev'd, 5 1 4 US 1 59 ( 1 995 ) (finding that surveys are relevant on the issue of likeli
hood of confusion) .
H r> Shari Seidman Diamond and Andrew Koppelman, Measured Endorsement, 6 0
Md L Rev 7 1 2, 7 1 6 (200 1 ) .
07 See generally Jerry A. Hausman, ed, Contingent Valuation: A Critical Assess
ment ( North-Holland, 1 993 ) .
sx
See, for example, Fritz Machlup, Marginal Analysis and Empirical R esearch . 36
Am Econ Rev 5 1 9 ( 1 946) ( arguing that people do not know their own m otivations, so
what people say about themselves should not be taken seriously). But see Truman
Bewley, Interviews as a Valid Empirical Tool in Economics, 3 1 J Socio-Econ 343, 34452 (2002) ( describing sampling, interviewing, and data analysis methods for surveys ) .
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To be clear, this Article is not advocating that all puffery should be
legally actionable. For example, if a company prints the phrase, "we
are bullish on this company's future prospects", in the company's an
nual report distributed to existing and potential shareholders, that
statement ought not be actionable due to it being a completely vague
assertion concerning the future that is unlikely to induce any false
implied meanings that directly affect investors' beliefs concerning
that company's securities. To be legally actionable, puffery must in
duce false implied meanings that are thus deceptive, misleading, and
can be disproved. A central point of this Article is that social psy
chological and marketing research demonstrates that puffery may en
gender or generate implied meanings not only cognitively, but also
emotionally.89
Moody investing means that the puffery defense is flawed because
vague, promotional, or hyperbolic statements can have real impacts
on moods and therefore should not be deemed immaterial as a mat
ter of law. A response to such mood impacts is that over time, people
may learn to ignore or discount puffery. But, such a response ignores
the fact that investors are not a fixed group, but instead consist of an
ever-changing pool of investors, who as they become older and if
wiser are replaced by a new cohort still wet behind the ears and ready
to be misled emotionally.90 Also problematic for such a response is
the vast empirical and experimental research finding that people are
systematically wrong in their forecasts of how they will feeP1 In fact,
"9 Shari Seidman Diamond and Linda Dimitropoulos, Deception and Puffery in
A dvertising: Behavioral Science Implications for R egulation, 23-24 Am B Found
Working Paper # 9 1 05 ( 1 994) ( discussing early empirical evidence that puffery can be
persuasive as a peripheral cue in addition to cognitive information ) . See also Raymond
R. Burke, et al, Deception by Implication: An Experimental Investigation, 14 J Con
sumer Rsrch 483, 486-91 ( 1998) ( presenting laboratory evidence that expansions of lit
erally true claims in advertisements increased false brand attributes, affect, and pur
chase intentions compared to control conditions ) .
90 Lynn Stout, Are S tock Markets Costly Casinos, 8 1 Va L Rev 6 1 1 , 637-40 ( 1 995 )
( making a similar argument about what happens when " D arwin Meets Barnum " ) .
9 1 Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Law and t h e Emotions: T h e Pro blems of Affective Fore
casting 80 Indiana L J ( forthcoming 2004) ( reviewing this literature and exploring its le
gal policy implications ); Christopher K. Hsee and Jiao Zhang, Distinction Bias. Mis
prediction and Mischoice Due to Joint Evaluation, 86 J Personality &Soc Psychol 680,
683-90 (2004) ( demonstrating experimentally that people often make predictions and
choices in the joint evaluation mode, but actually undergo experiences in the separate
or single evaluation mode); Christopher K. Hsee, et al, Lay R ationalism and Inconsis
tency between Predicted Experience and Decision, 16 J B ehav Dec Making 25 7, 25967 (2003 ) ( presenting evidence that decision-makers systematically overweight cold ra
tionalistic factors and underweight hot affective factors ); Christopher K. Hsee, et at
Medium Maximization, 30 J Consumer Rsrch 1, 4 - 1 1 ( reporting on experimental stud
ies finding that people have a tendency to base their decisions on specious i mmediate
payoffs instead of the ultimate consequences of their actions); George Loewenstein
and Daniel Adler, Projection Bias in Predicting Future Utility, l OS Econ J 929 ( 1 995 )
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people are often unconscious of how they feel .92 Cognitive biases and
heuristics provide a different set of non-moody reasons for question
ing the puffery defense.93
Recently, appellate courts in virtually every federal circuit court
have utilized the puffery defense to dismiss private securities fraud
actions based upon vague statements of corporate optimism .94 Courts
have also utilized the puffery defense to dismiss private securities
fraud actions against brokers.95 But, securities customers may be
more trusting of and so more subject to securities brokers engaging in
puffery to induce moody investing than securities customers are in
danger of securities issuers engaging in puffery to induce moody in
vesting. Securities customers may feel they are closer to and have
more of a personal relationship with their securities brokers than
with the issuers of securities. On the other hand, that p erceived close
ness and personal relationship could also mean that securities cus
tomers will come to appreciate the degree to which their securities
(presenting evidence that people fail to predict their future utility) ; George Loewen
stein, et al, Th e Effect of Sexua l A rousal on Expecta tions of Sexu a l Forcefulness, 34
J Rsrch Crime & Delinq 443, 445-47 ( 1 997) ( examining how young males in various
states of sexual arousal predict incorrectly how coercive they will be in sexual set
tings ); George Loewenstein and David Schkade, Wouldn't It B e Nice! Predicting Fu
tme Feelings in Daniel Kahneman, et al, eds, Well-Being: The Founda tions of Hedo
nic Psychology 85, 88- 1 00 ( Russell Sage, 1 999) (reviewing empirical evidence that
people make errors in predicting their feelings, discussing the sources of such errors,
and considering policy implications); Leaf Van Boven and George Loewenstein, Social
Projection of Transient Visceral Feelings. 29 Personality & Soc Psychol Bull 1 1 59
(2003 ) ( documenting that people have difficulty while in a hot stat e imagining them
selves to be in a cold state); and George Loewenstein, et al, Projection Bias in Predicting
Future Utility, 1 1 8 Q J Econ 1 209, 1 2 1 2- 1 6 ( 2003 ) (presenting and reviewing evidence
from a variety of domains that people systematically underestimate the magnitude of
changes in their future tastes ) . See also Daniel T. Gilbert, et al, Imm une Neglect: A
Source of Dura bility Bias in Affective Forecasting, 75 J Personality & Soc Psychol 6 1 7,
620-36 ( 1 998) ( discussing experimental evidence that people misestimate the duration
of their future feelings ); Daniel T. Gilbert, et al, Durability Bias in Affective Forecast
ing, in Gilovic, Heuristics and Biases at 292, 297-3 1 2 (cited in note 40) ( same); and
Daniel T. Gilbert &Timothy D. Wilson, Miswanting: Som e Problem s in the Forecast
ing of Future Affective Sta tes in Joseph P. Forgas, ed, Feeling and Thinking: The R ole of
Affect in Social Cognition 1 78, 1 85 -94 ( Cambridge, 2000) ( discussing research findings ) .
9 2 Wilson, Strangers to O urselves a t 1 1 7-35 ( cited i n note 6 8 ) ( discussing research
findings that people do not know how they feel) .
"3 Langevoort, Taming the Anim al Spirits a t 1 84-86 ( cited i n note 5 7 ) ( questioning
the cognitive applicability of the puffery defense in the context of open-market secu
rities fraud).
"" Jennifer O 'Hare, The R esurrection of the Dodo: The Unfortunate R e- em ergence
of the Puffery Defense in Private Securities Fraud Actions, 59 Ohio St L J 1 697, 1 70815 ( 1 998) ( documenting the prevalence of appellate courts accepting the puffery doc
trine to dismiss private securities fraud cases ) .
9·' I d a t 1 708 fns 47-5 1 ( citing and discussing such cases ) .
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brokers engage in puffery. Furthermore, there is a standard refrain
that if there are long-term relationships between securities brokers
and securities customers, securities brokers who are not myopic are
unlikely to engage in harmful puffery because of the value of repeated
interaction and their market reputations . In fact, the SEC has been
unwilling to dismiss enforcement actions against brokers based upon
the puffery defense, holding that the puffery defense does not apply
to such securities contexts.9 6
The problem with judicial early dismissal of a securities puffery
case as a matter of law under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 1 2( b ) ( 6 )
or a t summary j udgment is that a reasonable jury might have de
cided differently had that jury been given the opportunity to do so.
In other words, moody investing suggests that in terms of institu
tional competence, juries may possess a comparative advantage over
judges in being able to determine if puffery affects moods and in so
doing, securities investing. Several circuits hold that puffery is not
sufficiently definitive to give rise to any § l O( b ) liability.97 Similarly,
several courts have held that forward-looking statements are imma
terial and therefore harmless unless they rise to the level of a guaran% In the Matter of George f. Kolar, No 3-95 70, 1999 SEC LEXIS 2300, 79 n.3 l ( Oct.
28, 1999) (stating the " Commission has not generally been hospitable to claims that
statements made by a registered representative in the course of customer solicitation
are 'mere puffery ' ." ) ; and Id at 1 708 fn 5 6 ( citing and discussing other such enforcement
actions ) .
Y?
The Second Circuit held that " soft " statements of general optimism or "puffery
cannot have misled a reasonable investor . . . and cannot constitute actionable state
ments under the securities laws." San Leandro Em ergency Medical Group Profit Shar
ing Plan v Philip Morris Co, Inc, 75 F3d 8 0 1 , 8 1 1 ( 2d Cir 1 996). The Second Circuit also
held that a statement that diversification will result in continued prosperity, when that
statement is made with the knowledge that such a plan will actually reduce profits is
" precisely the type of 'puffery' that this and other circuits have consistently held to be
inactionable." L asker v New York Stat e Electric f!) Gas Corp, 8 5 F3d 55, 59 ( 2d Cir
1 996 ) . The Third C ircuit held that '"[s]oft,' 'puffing' statements . . . generally lack ma
teriality." In re Burlington Coat Factory Securities Litigation, 1 1 4 F3 d 1 4 1 0, 1 427-28
(3d Cir 1997). The Fourth Circuit held that a company's predictions in its annual report
that management believed that it could continue to grow net earnings at faster rate
than sales were too vague to be material. R aab v General Physics Corp, 4 F3d 286, 28990 ( 4th Cir 1993 ) . The Fifth Circuit stated that, " [p]rojections of future p erformance
not worded as guarantees are generally not actionable under the federal securities
laws ." Krim v BancTexas Group, Inc, 989 F2d 1 435, 1 446 ( 5 th Cir 1 993 ) ( citing Fried
m an v Mohasco Corp, 929 F2d 77 (2d Cir 199 1 ) and Hershfang v Citicorp, 767 F Supp
1 25 1 (SD NY 1 99 1 ) ) . The Seventh Circuit held that such promotional statements as
" describing a company as 'recession-resistant' lacks the requisite specificity to be con
sidered anything but optimistic rhetoric." Searls v Glasser, 64 F3d 106 1 , 1 066 ( 7th Cir
1 995 ) . The Seventh Circuit also held that " [w]here puffing is the order of the day, literal
truth can be profoundly misleading, as senders and recipients of letters of recommen
dation well know. Mere sales puffery is not actionable under Rule l Ob-S." Eisenstadt v
Centel Corp, 1 1 3 F3d 738, 746 ( 7th Cir 1 997).
*
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tee.98 Both notions of a virtual guarantee being a prerequisite to ma
teriality are problematic in light of empirical and experimental evi
dence that moody reactions to risk are insensitive to probability vari
ations.
In summary, moody investing means that the puffery defense and
the virtual guarantor test for the materiality of forward-looking state
ments are flawed because they are based upon only cognitive reac
tions to financial risks and information. So-called mere puffery may
nonetheless be material because of the positive, strong moods that it
evokes. Forward-looking statements that do not rise to the level of a
virtual guarantee may nonetheless instill and infuse their listeners
with euphoric moods that are not sensitive to probability variations .
The legal and policy implication of the literature about decision
making and moods is that unquestioning judicial acceptance of the
so-called puffery defense is unwarranted.
V.

" TOTAL MI X " VERSUS " TOTAL AFFEC T "

OF INFOR MATION

In articulating the standard for materiality, the United States Supreme
Court stated that "there must be a substantial likeliho o d that the dis
closure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the reasonable
investor as having significantly altered the 'total mix' of information
made available."99 The phrase " total mix" of information raises the
questions of just what is the mix of information that is available and
whether that mix should or does include information that is already
out there in the marketplace.
In particular, the truth-on-the-market defense argues that an is
suer's statements or omissions cannot be misleading if there already
is countervailing information, such as analysts' reports, in the public
domain that is therefore part of the "total mix" of information that
is available. 1 00 The metaphor of the "total mix" of information sug
gests many individual cognitive evaluations of pieces of information
9� Hillson Partners Ltd Partnersh ip v Adage, Inc, 42 F3d 204, 2 1 6 (4th Cir 1 994 )
( holding statements that " [t]he executive is looking for 1 992 sales of about $ 1 00 mil
lion and 1 993 sales of about $ 1 1 0 million" are immaterial because these " statements
are obviously not guarantees " )i Glasser, 64 F3d at 1 06 7 ( holding that " predictions of
'high' disposition gains cannot be held sufficiently definite so as to constitute material
misstatements of fact " li In re Browning-Ferris Indus . Inc. Sec. Litigation, 8 7 6 F Supp
8 70, 897 ( SD Tex 1 995 ) ( finding statements that predict growth but "not worded as
guarantees, are not actionable under the federal securities laws" )i R a a b, 4 F3d at 28990 ( same)i Lasker, F3d at 59 ( sameb and Krim v BancTexas Group, Inc, 989 F2d 1 446
( 5 th Cir 1 993 ) ( same).
99 TSC Industries, Inc v Northway, Inc, 426 US 438, 449 ( 1 976).
1 00
Wieglos v Comm onwealth Edison Co, 892 F2d 509, 5 1 6 ( 7th Cir 1 989).
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being added up into an overall cognitive evaluation of the " total mix"
of information . This cognitive aggregation can be performed by secu
rities market prices and/or by individuals.
Thus, a truth-on-the-market defense might be premised on the hy
pothesis that securities markets are informationally efficient in the
semi-strong sense, meaning that competitive market equilibrium se
curities prices encapsulate the entire " total mix" of information that
is publicly available in the sense of being sufficient statistics for that
aggregate information. 1 0 1 Theoretical financial economic models
demonstrate conditions under which securities market equilibrium
prices can aggregate initially dispersed information . 1 02 But, there are
no corresponding results about securities market prices aggregating
cognitive evaluations of risk and emotional reactions to risk or even
just aggregating different categories and valences of emotional reac
tions to risk.
On the other hand, a truth-on-the-market doctrine might be
premised upon individuals cognitively aggregating different sources
of information. 1 03 But, the United States Supreme Court has held that
" not every mixture with the true will neutralize the deceptive. If it
would take a financial analyst to spot the tension between the one
and the other, whatever is misleading will remain materially so, and
liability should follow." 1 04 In another case, a court found unconvinc
ing in certain contexts the above scenario of individuals locating,
reading, processing, and cognitively evaluating other information be
sides an issuer's disclosures. 1 05
101

Id at 5 1 6. See also In re Apple Computer Securities Litigation, 886 F2d 1 1 09,
1 1 1 4 (9th Cir 1989) ( stating that " it is a basic assumption of the securities laws that the
partially-informed investors will cancel each other out, and that Apple's stock price
will accurately reflect all relevant information"); In re Convergent Technologies Se
curities Litigation, 948 F2d 507, 5 13 (9th Cir 1 99 1 ) ( same); Phillips v L CI Intern .. Inc.
1 90 F3d 609, 6 1 7 ( 4th Cir 1999) ( same); and L ongman v Food Lion. Inc, 197 F3d 6 75,
685 ( 4th Cir 1 999) (same).
102
See, for example, Sanford J. Grossman and Joseph E Stiglitz, Inform ation and
Competitive Price Systems, 66 Am Econ Rev 246 ( 1 976) (providing such results); San
ford J. Grossman, On the Efficiency of Competitive Stock Markets When Investors
Have Diverse Inform ation, 3 1 J Fin 5 73 ( 1 976) ( same); Sanford J. Grossman, Further
R esults on the Informational Efficiency of Competitive Stock Markets When In
vestors Have Diverse Inform ation. 1 8 J Econ. Theory 8 1 ( 1978 ) ( same); Sanford J .
Grossman, An Introduction to the Th eory of R ational Expectations Under Asym
metric Inform ation, 48 Rev Econ Stud 5 4 1 ( 1 98 1 ) ( same ); and Roy Radner, R ational Ex
pectations Equilibrium: Generic Existence and the Inform ation R e vealed by Prices,
47 Econometrica 655 ( 1 979) ( same ) .
1 01
See, for example, R odman v Grant Foundation, 608 F2d 64, 70 ( CA NY 1979);
Seibert v Sperry R and Corp, 586 F2d 949, 952 (2d Cir 1 9 78 ) .
1 04 Virginia Bankshares, Inc v Sandberg, S O l US 1083, 1 097 ( 199 1 ).
1 0"
United Paperworkers International Union v International Paper Co, 985 F2d
1 190 (2d Cir 1993 ).
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But, even reasonable investors will neither cognitively evaluate,
nor emotionally react to items that are not part of the " total mix" of
information. But, even for items that are in the " total mix" of infor
mation, the "total affect" of information differs from the "total mix"
of that information in the cognitive sense. Moody investing m eans
that emotionally neutral items in the "total mix" of information may
not have much impact. For example, investors are likely to ignore
boilerplate that is presented in an emotionally neutral fashion. Psy
chological experiments about how people form global retrospective
evaluations of affective experiences felt over time find that people do
not simply add up their moment-by-moment affective experiences. 106
Instead, people utilize a peak-and-end rule, whereby they focus on
the peak and end affective levels. An open empirical question is
whether the same is true of mood responses to information.
Another open empirical question is whether or to what extent even
emotionally negative information sufficiently offsets the impact of
emotionally positive information or other optimistic information.
There is cognitive psychological evidence that our minds absorb in
formation first from images, second from sounds, and third from
texts. 1 07 This evidence suggests that emotionally negative images or
pictures ( such as televised press conferences) are likely to have the
most impact, followed by emotionally negative audio recordings ( such
as radio broadcasts or internet webcasts ), with emotionally negative
documents or written information ( such as press releases or newspa
per articles ) least likely to offset emotionally positive statements.
Recent marketing research finds television commercials involving
conflicting emotions result in less favorable attitudes by viewers with
a lower propensity to accept duality, such as Anglo Americans or
younger adults than viewers with a higher propensity to accept duality,
such as Asian Americans and older adults . 1 08 Can and should securi1 0"

See, for example, Barbara L . Frederickson, Extra c ting Meaning from Past Affec
tive Experiences: The Importance of Peaks, Ends and Specific Emotions, 1 4 C ognition
& Emotion 5 77 ( 2000); Barbara L. Frederickson and Daniel Kahneman, Duration Ne
glect in R etrospective Evaluations of Affective Episodes. 65 J Personality & Soc Psy
cho! 45 ( 1 993 ); Daniel Kahneman, et al, When More Pain is Preferred t o L ess: A dding
a Better End, 4 Psycho! Sci 40 1 ( 1 993 ); Donald A. Redelmeier &Daniel Kahneman, Pa
tients' Memories of Painful Medical Treatments: R eal-time and R etrospective Evalu
ations of Two Minim ally Invasive Procedures, 66 Pain 3 ( 1 996 ); Carol Varey and Dan
iel Kahneman, Experiences Extended Across Time: Evalu ation of Moments and
Episodes, 5 J Behav Decision Making 1 69 ( 1992 ) .
1 07 Paul Tulenko, Traditional Ways to A dvertise Work Well ·with Updated Ideas,
Milwaukee J & Sentinel at 2D ( Oct. 23, 2000).
1 0B Patti A. Williams and Jennifer L . Aaker, Can Mixed Emotions Peacefully Co
Exist!, 28 J Consumer Rsrch 636, 639-48 (2002) ( reporting on experiments concerning
the psychological impact of mixed emotions on attitudes). See also G. D ouglas Olsen
and John W. Pracejus, Integration of Positive and Negative Affective Stimuli, 14 J Con-
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ties regulations differentiate among emotional appeals made to demo
graphic subgroups of society by age, culture, ethnicity; or sex in light
of Constitutional equal protection issues raised by these research
findings that consumer processing of mixed emotional appeals varies
by age, culture, and situations ? What are the legal implications of
the finding that emotional responses can interact with one another?
It is unclear from cognitive psychology whether the SEC should
mandate the order of presenting positive information and negative
information. On the one hand, the contrast effect finds that "infor
mation that is presented against a contrasting background is often
perceived disproportionately." 1 1 1 This suggests requiring positive in
formation precede negative information so that the latter can stand
out in contrast to the former. In addition, the "recentness effect" sug
gests that the last piece of information that a p erson hears is the most
accessible piece of information for that person. On the other hand,
the primacy effect suggests requiring negative information precede
positive information because information presented first tends to
have more influence on forming an overall impression than informa
tion presented later. m In addition, the priming effect suggests that
initial information affects and conditions the interpretation of sub
sequent information . 1 1 3 Overall, the availability heuristic suggests
that whatever piece of information b ecomes uppermost in the minds
of an audience, whether due to primacy; recentness, typicality; or
some other such effect, is perceived disproportionately and comes to
carry more weight than less activated pieces of information. 1 14
In summary; moody investing means that the "total affect" of in
formation can and will differ from the 11 total mix11 of that informa
tion in the cognitive sense. Although a cognitive evaluation for the
" total mix11 of information may integrate various cognitive evalua
tions of distinct items of information, it is an open empirical ques
tion if, how, or to what extent individuals or securities market prices
1 09

1 10

sumer Psychol ( forthcoming, 2004 ) ( reporting on two experiments investigating how
positive and negative affective stimuli combine to influence overall affective responses
to an advertisement, content-specific beliefs, and overall evaluations).
1o9
Id.
110
Jennifer Edson Escalas and Barbara B. Stern, Sympathy and Empathy· Em otional
R esponses to Advertising Dram as, 29 J Consumer Rsrch 5 66, 5 70-76 ( 2003 ) ( reporting
on two experiments).
111
Joachim Goldberg and Rudiger von Nitzsch, Beh avioral Finance 4 1 ( John Wiley
& Sons, 200 1 ) .
112
Elliot Aronson, The Social Anim al 1 29 -3 1 (WH Freeman 6th ed, 1 992) ( describ
ing and explaining the primacy effect in impression formation).
1u
Id at 1 24-26 ( describing and explaining the priming effect in impression forma
tion); Goldberg and Von Nitzsch, Beh avioral Finance at 43-44 (cited in note 1 1 1 )
1 1 "'
Goldberg and Von Nitzsch, Behavioral Finance at 3 7-39 ( cited in note 1 1 1 ) ( dis
cussing the availability heuristic ) .
.
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amalgamate cognitive evaluations of and emotional reactions to in
formation. It is also unclear how various emotional reactions to dis
tinct items of information come together to form an overall emotional
reaction for the "total mix" of information. Despite these uncertain
ties, which suggest further specific areas for additional empirical and
theoretical researchi the legal and policy implication of current em
pirical and theoretical knowledge about moody decision-making is to
modify the " total mix" analysis of materiality to include investiga
tion of the "total affect" of information. Such an inquiry may sound
murky; but given that the " total mix" analysis is already murky; the
incremental murkiness from investigating " total affect" should be
manageable. In addition, this inquiry does not have to rely solely on
the introspection of judges or juries, but can and should b enefit from
empirical surveys of investors and expert witness testimony by econ
omists, social psychologists, and marketing professors. In particular,
potential defendants can and should achieve some degree of protec
tion from legal liability by having social psychologists and marketing
firms conduct empirical survey research concerning the likely " total
affect" of information regarding an issuer's securities .
VI.

H O W AFFECTIVE AND EFFECTIVE IS

MEANING FU L CAUTIONARY LANGUAG E ?

The judicially created "bespeaks caution" doctrine protects opti
mistic forward-looking statements including forecasts, proj ections,
and opinions from allegations of misrepresentation and omission
when those statements are accompanied by meaningful cautionary
language. 1 1 5 Under the "bespeaks caution " doctrine, forward-looking
statements accompanied by meaningful cautionary language are
deemed to be immaterial . Courts have utilized the "bespeaks cau
tion" doctrine to rule on the pleadings as a matter of law; usually by
granting a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim or a m otion
for summary judgment .
By offering protection from liability; the "bespeaks caution" doc
trine provides another incentive for issuers and others to make soft
information available to investors . 1 1 6 The same incentive effect ap1 1'

See generally Donald C. Langevoort, Disclosures That "Bespeak Caution. " 49
Bus Law 48 1 ( 1 994) ( analyzing three variations of the "bespeaks caution" doctrine, iden
tifying two distinct, but related rationales for the doctrine and proposing refinement
of the doctrine); and Jennifer O'Hare, Good Faith and the Bespeaks Caution Doctrine:
It's Not Just A S tate of Mind, 5 8 U Pitt L Rev 6 1 9 ( 1 997 ) ( discussing alternative legal
rationales courts have utilized in developing the " bespeaks caution" doctrine ) .
1 16
Langevoort, Disclosmes a t 499 (cited i n note 1 1 5 ) ( noting that a virtue o f the "be
speaks caution" doctrine is that it encourages companies and promoters t o disclose
more information to investors ) .
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plies to statutory safe harbors that codify the "bespeaks caution"
doctrine . 1 1 7 Historically, both the courts and the SEC consistently
prohibited or at least discouraged issuers of securities from providing
soft information. 1 1 8 One rationale for this hostility to soft informa
tion was the SEC's inability to review the accuracy of such hard-to
verify information and fears that ( especially unsophisticated) investors
would place undue reliance on soft information. 1 19 But, in 1 978, the
SEC adopted Securities Act Rule 1 75 and Securities Exchange Act
Rule 3b-6, 1 2 0 which provide safe harbors for certain forward-looking
statements in SEC filings by issuers of securities. In addition, the SEC
mandates the disclosure of " known trends or uncertainties " reason
ably expected to have material impact on the financial condition of
a company in the management discussion and analysis ( MD &A )
section o f such required SEC filings a s prospectuses and annual
reports. 1 2 1
The phrase "bespeaks caution" is from a case in which a court held
that certain statements "bespeak caution in outlook and fall far short
of the assurances required for a finding of falsity and fraud." 1 2 2 In that
securities fraud case alleging intentional misrepresentations in an of
fering memorandum, the court held that such allegations did not sur
vive a motion to dismiss because the memorandum also contained
accompanying cautionary language . 1 23 The court stated that: "We are
not inclined to impose liability on the basis of statements that clearly
'bespeak caution. " ' 1 24
A leading case of the "bespeaks caution" doctrine involved an offer
ing of $675 million in bonds by Donald Trump and a partnership to fi
nance the completion of the Taj Mahal casino/hotel in Atlantic City. 125
117
Marilyn F. Johnson, et al, The Impo ct of Securities Litigotion R eform on the Dis
closure of Forword-Looking Informotion by High- Technology Firms, 39 J Acct Rsrch
297 (200 1 ) ( finding, in a sample of 523 computer hardware, computer software, and
pharmaceutical companies, significant increases in both the frequency of companies
that made general qualitative financial forecasts and the mean number of forecasts a
year after the passage of the statutory safe harbors codifying the "bespeaks caution"
doctrine, with a significant number of first-time forecasters and the greatest increases
among companies at greatest risk of a lawsuit ) .
11'
Sec, for example, Securities Act Release No 5 180 ( Oct. 1 6, 197 1); and Gerstle v
Gomble-Skogmo, Inc, 478 F2d 1 28 1, 1294 ( 2d Cir 1973 ) .
1 1�
See, for example, South Coast Services Corp v Santa Ana Valley Irrigation Co,
669 F2d 1265, 1270 (9th Cir 1982).
1 20
17 CFR § 230 . 1 75; 17 CFR § 240 . 1 3b-6; see also Securities Act Release No. 6084
(June 25, 1979) .
121
17 CFR § 229.303 (2002) .
1 22
Polin v Conductron Corp, 552 F2d 797, 802 fn 28 ( 8 th Cir 197 7 ) .
m L u c e v Edelstein. 802 F2d 4 9 (2d C i r 198 6 ) .
1 24
Id at 56.
1 2"
In re Donald f. Trump Casinos Securities Litigation- Taj Mahal Litigation. 7 F3d
357 (3d Cir 1 993 ) .
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The offering prospectus stated the partnership believed that revenues
from the casino/hotel would be sufficient to cover the interest and
principal of the bonds . The prospectus also contained numerous dis
claimers and cautionary statements identifying risk factors and
warned there could be no assurances that the casino/hotel would be
profitable or that it will generate sufficient revenues to cover the debt
service of the bonds .
The court held that " abundant and meaningful cautionary lan
guage" in the prospectus " not only . . . generally convey the riskiness
of the investment, but its warnings and cautionary language directly
address the substance of the statement the plaintiffs challenge." 1 26
The court also held that application of the "bespeaks caution" doc
trine must be made on a case-by-case basis. 1 27 This court's reasoning
that optimistic forward-looking statements are offset by " meaningful
cautionary language" because the " total mix" of information is unaf
fected ignores the powerful affect of such optimistic forward-looking
statements. This court's argument suffers from the same criticisms
that were raised in the last section about how the "total mix" analysis
of materiality differs from the "total affect" of multiple statements.
Despite this court fully embracing the "bespeaks caution" doc
trine, this court did "not establish a sweeping rule that cautionary
statements will always render misrepresentations or o missions im
material as a matter of law." 1 28 Instead, the court stressed the impor
tance of context. 1 29 In addition, this court held that " [ t ] o suffice, the
cautionary statements must be substantive and tailored to the spe
cific future proj ections, estimates or opinions in the prospectus the
plain tiffs challenge." I 3o
Another leading case illustrating the "bespeaks caution" doctrine
involved an IPO followed by a $92 million "junk bond" offering by
Worlds of Wonder (WOW), a high-technology toy company that
achieved quick and enormous success with its only two lines of toys:
Teddy Ruxpin, a talking teddy bear, and Lazer Tag, an infared toy
weapon game. 1 3 1 Both offering prospectuses contained warnings of
WOW's dependence on its limited number of product lines and in
cluded a number of other specific risk factors. The court held that
" [ e ]stimates or forecasts of future performance in a prospectus are not
actionable if the prospectus contains conspicuous language that be
speaks caution as to actual results. Furthermore, the cautionary lan1

�" lei at 3 72.
1 2 7 lcl at 3 7 l .
1 2' Icl at 3 73 fn 16.
12 Y
Icl at 3 73 .
110

11 1

Icl at 3 7 1 -72.
In re Worlds of Won der Securities Litigation. 8 14 F Supp 850 ( N D Cal 1 993 ) .
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guage must specifically disclose the nature and extent of the risks in
volved." 132 But other stronger instances of the "bespeaks caution"
doctrine convey talismanic significance to boilerplate cautionary
language that is not narrowly tailored to specific forecasts. In fact, the
strongest example of the "bespeaks caution" doctrine involved a dis
trict court dismissing a securities fraud claim merely because of the
existence of such nearly boilerplate cautionary language as found in
these quotations: "future operating results are difficult to predict and
no representation or warranty of any kind is made," "no warranty is
or can be made as to the future operations or of the amount of any fu
ture income," " [t] here is no assurance that actual events will corre
spond with these hypothetical assumptions," and " [a]ctual results
may or may not approximate such statements." 133 Instead of examin
ing the allegedly fraudulent financial forecasts carefully and in the
context of these cautionary statements, the court simply and me
chanically gave prominence to such broad warnings in dismissing the
case for failure to state a claim. The decision has the feel of a judicial
heuristic being applied merely because of its simplicity.
Moody investing means that the "bespeaks caution" doctrine is
problematic because meaningful cautionary language concerns the
probability of the optimistic forward-looking statements being real
ized. But, if those optimistic statements have induced positive moods
or emotional reactions, such feelings are insensitive to probability
variations. Because these positive feelings display probability insensi
tivity, merely disclosing the low probability of success or the high prob
ability of losses will not have much of an impact on those who experi
ence such feelings. Thus, even cautionary language that is cognitively
meaningful may be neither affectively nor effectively meaningful.
Judicial explanations of why meaningful cautionary language
should result in the dismissal of a case fall into two categories. First
is the notion that meaningful cautionary language dilutes optimistic
statements to such a degree that such statements are no longer opti
mistic and so they could not mislead any reasonable investor. 1 34 Sec
ond is the idea that cautionary language takes away the right of plain
tiffs to rely on forward-looking statements, even if those statements
w Id at 859.
1.n Schwartz v Mich aels, [ 1 992 Transfer Binder] Fed Sec L Rep ljJ 96,920 ( SO N Y July
23, 1 992 ) .
11 4 See, for example, I. Meyer Pincus eJ Assoc v Oppenheimer eJ Co, 936 F2d 759,
763 ( 2d Cir 1 99 1 ) ( " statements contained within the prospectus clearly 'bespeak cau
tion, ' rather than encouraging optimism." ); and Donald Trump, F3d at 3 73 ( " accom
panying warnings and cautionary language served to negate any potentially mislead
ing effect that the prospectus' statement about the Partnership's belief in its ability to
repay the bonds would have on a reasonable investor." ).
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are optimistic . 1 35 Both explanations concern how a reasonable in
vestor reacts to optimistic forward-looking information in light of
cautionary language . Both explanations assume that a reasonable in
vestor evaluates optimistic forward-looking information in the con
text of cautionary language in a purely cognitive manner. In 1 99 4 ,
there was a lack of "broad-based empirical studies that adequately de
scribe how the normal investing population makes its investment
decisions !' 1 36 But, we now have plenty of empirical and experimental
evidence of moody investing. Those whose moods change in response
to securities disclosures may still be misled by and rely on optimistic
forward-looking information despite cautionary language.
In fact, " the claim that reasonable investors cannot be misled by
caution-ladden estimates and proj ections is probably wrong even with
respect to the more sophisticated and rational segment of the investor
population." 1 37 This is even more so with those institutional or pro
fessional investors whose moods also change in response to estimates
and projections . Also, " courts that rested their bespeaks caution
analysis simply on the belief that cautionary language automatically
negates the optimistic message otherwise contained in forward
looking disclosures are wrong." 138 Again, this applies with even m ore
force when and where investors react emotionally to forward-looking
disclosures . Warnings of the risks and uncertainties via cautionary
language do not necessarily displace positive affect because of the
probability insensitivity of emotions.
The above concerns that meaningful cautionary language may
lack any effect on emotions apply equally to § 27 A of the S ecurities
Act of 1 933, 1 39 and § 2 1 E of the Securities Exchange Act of 1 93 4 . 1 40
These statutory safe harbors (under the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1 995 14 1 ) codified the "bespeaks caution" doctrine for
those issuers who are required to file periodic reports under the Se"'" See, for example, In re Integrated Resources R eal Estate L td Partnership Sec Litig,
8 1 5 F Supp 620, 6 72 ( SD NY 1 993 ) ( "However, the warnings show that future presenta
tions are merely projections, not statements of fact upon which the Plaintiffs can rely." ),
appeal dismissed, 3 F3d 49 (2d Cir 1 993 ) ; CL- A lexanders Laing f!J Cruicksh ank v Gold
feld, 739 F Supp 1 5 8, 1 62 (SD NY 1 990) ( " cautionary language . . . does limit the extent
to which a plaintiff may reasonably rely on the statements and data in the prospectus." );
and Friedm an v Arizona World Nurseries Ltd Par tnership, 730 F Supp 5 2 1 , 54 1 ( SD NY
1 990) ( " warnings and disclaimers . . . clearly limit[ed] the degree to which an investor
could reasonably rely on these [offering] documents as a forecast of the future." ) .
Jl(, Langevoort, Disclosures a t 492 f n 73 ( cited i n note 1 1 5 ) .
w Id at 494.
' ·'x Id at 497.
13 " 1 5 USC 77z-2 ( 2002 ) .
1 40
1 5 U S C 78u-5 ( 2002).
141
Pub L No 1 04-67, 1 09 Stat 73 7 (amendments codified in scattered sections of 1 5
USC and 1 8 USC ) .
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curities Exchange Act of 1934. These sections shield certain forward
looking statements from private actions under the anti-fraud provi
sions of the federal securities laws. 142 To be afforded such protection,
a forward-looking statement must be " accompanied by meaningful
cautionary statements identifying important factors that could cause
actual results to differ materially from those in the forward-looking
statement." t43
These safe harbors extend to oral forward-looking statements. t 44 To
be afforded such protection, an oral forward-looking statement must
be "accompanied by a cautionary statement . . . that actual results
could [might ] differ materially from those projected in the forward
looking statement" t45 and identify " a readily available written docu
ment " containing " additional information concerning factors that
could cause actual results to differ materially from those in the
forward-looking statement ." l46 In applying the safe harbor provided by
§ 2 1 E of the Securities Exchange Act of 1 934, t47 the Eleventh Circuit
held that cautionary language, to be meaningful, does not have to " ex
plicitly mention the factor that ultimately belies a forward-looking
statement" and that "when an investor has been warned of risks of a
significance similar to that actually realized, she is sufficiently on
notice of the danger of the investment to make an intelligent decision
about it according to her own preferences for risk and reward." t 4 8
In summary; moody investing means that even when cautionary
language is meaningful in a cognitive sense (as opposed to being ig
nored as boilerplate), it may be meaningless in a moody sense. The in
sights of economic models and psychological theories about moody
investing suggest refining applications of both the "bespeaks cau
tion" doctrine and statutory safe harbors codifying that doctrine to
make them more sensitive to whether any cautionary language is in
fused with sufficient negative affect offsetting the positive feelings
induced by optimistic forward-looking statements .
V II.

CONCLUSIONS

This Article has critically analyzed three relatively recent doctrinal
developments in jurisprudence by the United States Supreme Court
and lower courts about securities litigation and enforcement . These
1 42

15 USC 7 7z-2(c)( 1 ) (2002); 15 USC 78u-5( c )( 1 ) (2002).
1
5 USC 7 7z-2( c )( 1 )(A)(i) ( 2002); 1 5 USC 78u-5( c)( 1 )(A)(i) (2002) .
14'
1 44 1 5 USC 7 7z-2( c)(2) (2002); 1 5 U S C 78u-5 ( c )(2) (2002 ) .
1 4 5 1 5 U S C 7 7z-2( c ) (2)(A)(ii) ( 2002); 1 5 USC 78u-5 ( c ) (2)(A)(ii) (2002).
1 4 6 15 USC 7 7z-2( c ) ( 2 ) ( B ) ( i ) ( 2002); 15 USC 78u-5( c ) ( 2)( B ) ( i ) (2002) .
147 1 5 U S C 78u-5 (2002) .
1 4s Harris v Ivax Corp, 1 82 F3d 799, 807 ( 1 1 th Cir 1990 ) .
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three judicial trends involve the acceptance of certain defenses in se
curities fraud cases. The first development is judicial recognition of
the so-called puffery defense, which states that mere puffery is not
material and therefore not actionable under federal securities laws .
The second development is judicial acceptance of the so-called truth
on-the-market defense, which exemplifies the so-called "total mix"
of information analysis . The third development is the judicially cre
ated so-called "bespeaks caution" doctrine and statutory safe harbors
codifying it.
This Article advocates rethinking the central notions of material
ity of information and reasonableness of investors. In p articular, this
Article contends that the so-called puffery defense is problematic be
cause it fails to acknowledge that puffery can affect m oods and in so
doing influence securities investing. This Article also recommends
expanding the so-called "total mix" of information analysis by con
sidering the " total affect" of information. This Article finally sug
gests an extension of the so-called "bespeaks caution" doctrine and
statutory safe harbors codifying it by a determination of whether so
called " meaningful cautionary language" affects moods .
The fundamental thesis of this Article is that statements about se
curities in addition to their cognitive component may carry an affec
tive component, which influences decisions by some investors . This
observation means that several judicial doctrines based upon a belief
about how investors process cognitive information are therefore mis
guided. The SEC basically does not regulate affect, and hence securi
ties issuers and securities brokers have opportunities to exploit secu
rities markets without facing any legal and regulatory consequences
from the SEC . This means that certain statements which the SEC
treats as being cognitively meaningless, such as so-calle d puffery, may
actually have an effect, while other statements which the SEC con
siders to be cognitively meaningful, such as the bespeaks caution doc
trine and the " total mix" analysis, actually have little or no influence
upon securities investors . To be clear, this Article does not argue that
everybody always engages in moody investing, but instead that cer
tain situations are more likely to foster moody investing. The impor
tant point for legal policy is that securities issuers, brokers, and other
professionals can generate such environments by their disclosures,
advertising, and other attempts to persuade investors . The perspec
tive of this Article is consistent with the recently proposed notion
that people are situational characters as opposed to rational actors.
1 4Y

1 • " Jon D . Hanson and David Yosifon, The Situation: An Introdu ction to th e Situa
tional Character, Critical R e alism , Power Economics, and Deep Capture, 1 52 U Pa L
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A recent content analysis of 547 mutual funds advertisements that
appeared in Barron's or Money found that such ads did not provide the
information that financial theory suggests as critical for making in
formed and sound investment choices . 150
Although it may seem that restricting the scope of the puffery de
fensei undertaking a " total affective mix" analysisi altering the scope
of the protection that both the " bespeaks caution" doctrine and
statutory safe harbors codifying that doctrine provides raises First
Amendment concernsi so could the whole regulatory philosophy of
mandatory securities disclosuresi and most of securities regulation,
because it concerns how securities issuers and professionals are per
mitted to communicate with securities investors. 15 1 But, the United
States Supreme Court has long since rej ected the position that speech
employed directly or indirectly to sell securities is totally protected
by the First Amendment. 1 5 2 In fact, the United States Supreme Court
suggested that the commercial speech doctrine's First Amendment
protections do not detract from governmental power to regulate se
curities . 153 Moreover, the United States Supreme Court distinguished
securities regulation from the more general category of commercial
speech regulation . 154
It is worth noting, in closing, that several of the current research
trends on the role of moods in persuasion that this Article applied to
particular securities regulations issues have broader implications for
many other legal and policy areas. For example, such ambient char
acteristics as candlelight and comforting, soft music can increase the
Rev 1 29, 1 55 ( 2003 ) ( arguing for " an approach to legal theory that conceptualizes
people's behavior more accurately in the locus of situation" based upon social psycho
logical experimental research). See also Edward L. Glaeser, Psychology and the Mar
ket, 94 Am Econ Rev 408, 409 n.2 ( 2004) (arguing that emotional aspects of decision
making explain the power of situations ) .
l so
Bruce A. Huhmann and Nalinaksha Bhattacharyya, Does Mutual Fund Adver
tising Practice Conform to Financial Theories of the Information Needed for Invest
ment Decisions' (unpublished manuscript, available at www. ssrn.com ) ( Mar. 5, 2004 ) .
101
There is a nascent literature attempting to reconcile securities regulation and
the First Amendment. See Donald E. Lively, Securities R egulation and the Freedom of
the Press. Toward A Marketplace of Ideas in the Marketplace of Investment, 60 Wash
L Rev 843 ( 1 985 ); Michael E. S choeman, The First Amendment and R estrictions on
A dvertising of Securities Under the Securities Act of 1 933, 4 1 Bus Law 3 7 7 I 1 98 6 ); The
First Amendment and Federal Securities R egulation: A Symposium . 20 Conn L Rev
26 1 ( 1 98 8 ) ; and Symposium, The First Amendm ent and Government R egulation of
Economic Markets, Brook L Rev 5 ( 1 98 9 ) .
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See, for example, Paris A dult The atre I v Slaton, 4 1 3 US 49, 6 1 -62, 64 ( 1 9 7 5 ), and
cases cited.
1'3 Ohralick v Ohio S tate Bar Assn, 436 US 447, 456 ( 1 97 8 ) .
1s'
Dun eJ Bradstreet, Inc v Greenmoss Builders, 472 US 749, 478 fn 5 ( 1 9 8 5 ) .
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duration of eating. 1 55 In particular, advances in the marketing and so
cial psychology literatures raise these important positive and norma
tive questions for the legal system. 1 56 First, can law influence the in
terplay between automatically induced affective reactions and more
controlled, effortful cognitive reactions ? 1 57 Second, should law regu
late differently hot emotions and cold emotions, which require more
cognitive processing? 1 58 Third, in light of the finding that affective
states of the same valence have distinct, predictable influences on per
suasion, decision making, and motivation, 1 59 how should the legal sys
tem account for specific emotions? 1 6° Fourth, given that older adults
1 " 5 Brian Wansink, Environmental Factors That Increase the Food Intake and Con
sumption Volume of Unknowing Consum ers, 24 Ann Rev Nutrition 455, 460-6 1 , 4 7 1
( 2004) ( reporting o n how the atmospherics o f eating environments influence the length
of eating).
1 56 This brief synopsis draws upon Patti Williams, Th e R ole of Emotions in Per
suasion, Address at the Association for Consumer Research Doctoral Consortium
(Oct. 9, 2003 ) .
1 5 7 Baba Shiv and Alexander Fedorikhin, Heart and Mind i n Conflict: The Interplay
of Affect and Cognition in Consumer Decision Making, 26 J Consumer Rsrch 2 78,
282-90 ( 1 999) ( reporting on two experiments ) .
1" Roger Giner-Sorolla, Guilty Pleasures and Grim Necessities.· Affec tive A tti
tudes in Dilem mas of Self-Control, 80 J Personality & Soc Psycho! 206, 208 - 1 9 (200 1 )
( reporting on four studies ) .
1 "9 Rajagopal Raghunathan and Michel Tuan Pham, All Negative Moods A re Not
Equal: Motivational Influences of A nxiety and Sadness on Decision Making, 22 Org
Behav & Human Decision Processes 56, 63-72 ( 1 999) ( reporting differences in the be
havior of anxious versus sad individuals for gambling and job selection ); Jennifer S.
Lerner &Dacher Keltner, Fear, Anger. and Risk, 8 1 J Personality & Soc Psycho! 1 46,
1 47 (200 1 ) ( finding that fearful people make pessimistic risk estimates and risk-averse
choices, while angry people make optimistic risk estimates and risk-seeking choices );
Daniel M.T Fessler, Elizabeth G . Pillsworth, and Thomas J. Flamson, A ngry Men and
Disgusted Wom en: An Evolu tionary Approach to the Influence of Emotions on Risk
Taking, 95 Org Behav & Human D ecision Processes 1 07 ( 2004 ) ( demonstrating that
anger increases risk taking by m en, but disgust decreases risk taking by women);
and David DeSteno et al, Discrete Emotions and Persu asion: Th e R ole of Emotion
Induced Expectancies, 86 J Personality & Soc Psycho! 43, 45 ( 2004 ) ( fi nding that spe
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See, for example, Frank Ackerman and Lisa Heinzerling, Priceless: On Knowing
the Price of Everything and the Value of Nothing 1 3 0-36 ( New, 2004 ) ( discussing legal
implications of anxiety over dreaded risks); Rachel Moran, Fear Unbound: A Reply
to Professor Suns tein, 42 Washburn L J 1 , 5 ( 2002) ( criticizing legal policies based on
merely cognitive approaches to analyzing fear); Rachel Moran, Law and Emotion, Love
and Hate, 1 1 J Con temp Legal Issues 747, 754-83 (200 1 ) ( analyzing hate crime laws and
these three torts: seduction, alienation of affection, and criminal conversation ); Mar
tin E . P. Seligman, et al, Why Lawyers Are Unhappy, 23 Cardozo L Rev 33, 35, 39-53
(200 1 ) (analyzing how the new field of "positive psychology" suggests ways to improve
the quality of life at large law firms); and Cass R. Sunstein, The Laws of Fear, 1 1 5 Harv
L Rev 1 1 1 9 ( 2002) (reviewing Paul Slovic, The Perception of Risk ( 2000 ) ) .
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pay more attention to emotional than rational advertising appeals, 161
what are the implications for the debate among legal scholars about
paternalism ? 162 Fifth, given the recent advances in the neuropsychol
ogy of affect, 1 63 what are the ethical, legal, and social implications of
the research on the neuropsychology of affect ? 164
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